Introduction
The European Parliament (EP) has undergone major changes since its establishment. The institution's purview has broadened and its powers have strengthened since its conception as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community; it has evolved from a consultative body into one of the more powerful institutions within the European Union (EU) (Hix and Hoyland, 2013; Kreppel, 2002; Scully, 2005) . Given that the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are now able to enact legislation in a wide range of policy sectors, it is vital that we understand MEPs' attitudes and voting behaviour because it offers insight into the kind of parliamentary representation they provide (Farrell and Scully, 2007; Hix et al., 2007; Scully et al., 2012) . For example, whether MEPs' main loyalty lies with their national party or their EP party group has significant repercussions for the EP's ability to provide supranational representation for European citizens.
While numerous studies indicate that national parties are MEPs' primary principals (e.g., Coman, 2009; Hix et al., 2007; Ringe, 2010) , the contemporary interpretation of MEPs' voting choices derives from analyses of roll call votes. At the same time, roll call votes do not appear to be representative of parliamentary voting occasions at large and include a degree of 'selection bias' (Carrubba et al., 2006; Hug, 2010; Thiem, 2006; Yordanova and Mühlböck, 2014) , 1 raising questions about the ability of roll call analyses to offer a complete picture of MEPs' parliamentary behaviour. If MEPs' behaviour during roll call is not representative of all voting occasions, it is important that we consider whether and how MEPs' behaviour varies across different types of voting procedures.
This paper studies the presence and direction of the voting procedure effect in MEPs' suggested voting behaviour, and it looks at the extent to which MEPs believe that they are influenced by the choice of the voting procedure. (e.g., Carrubba et al., 2006; Corbett et al., 2011; Thiem, 2006) , I argue that MEPs are more 1 Although not all studies support the presence of bias in roll call samples , there is increasing evidence to show that discrepancies exist between roll call and non-roll call votes in the EP. 2 For detailed information on the voting procedures used in the EP, see its Rules of Procedure (2014) . 3 The term 'national party' refers to the national party and its leadership in MEPs' home country, encompassing the domestic 'party in central office' and the domestic 'party in the public office' (Katz and Mair, 1993). inclined to defect from their EP party group when voting by show of hands or electronically, as opposed to roll call. Second, building on insights about the differences between the role and self-perceptions of MEPs from 2004/07 accession countries and MEPs from pre-2004 member states (EES, 2012; Farrell et al., 2011) , I expect this voting procedure effect to be more pronounced among MEPs from the accession countries.
I evaluate these arguments using an original MEP survey conducted in 2011, and find that a significant voting procedure effect is present in MEPs' perceptions of their approach to representation. Nearly 30% of MEPs claim to behave differently when voting by non-roll call methods, and the vast majority of these MEPs consider themselves to be more likely to defect from their EP party group in favour of their national party. (Coman, 2009; Hix and Noury, 2009) , the findings presented here show that a larger proportion of MEPs from 2004/07 accession countries change their approach to representation as a result of a vote being taken by non-roll call instead of roll call. Thus, differences between how these groups behave in the EP may be more significant than previously acknowledged.
Competing Loyalties and Voting Procedures
MEPs have three more salient loyalties when carrying out their duties in the EP: their EP party group, national party, and electorate (Hix et al., 2007; Hix and Hoyland, 2011) . For example, national parties have the ability to influence MEPs' behaviour primarily because of their significance in the electoral arena. Their power to decide who is allowed to stand as a party candidate and where candidates are placed on the party list has implications for who gets elected. By contrast, EP party groups have no real control over MEPs' chances to get reelected, but they hold significant power over MEPs' ability to influence policy-making in the EP. Among else, they determine the leadership positions within the EP (Corbett et al., 2011; Hix et al., 2007) . Given that these principals represent different stakeholders, how MEPs respond to the contrasting expectations of these actors gives us valuable information about the kind of representation they provide. Arguably, the EP would be better able to represent European-wide interests if MEPs were to prioritise the positions of their supranational EP party group.
Given the growing importance of the EP, it is unsurprising that MEPs' voting choices have been the subject of numerous empirical studies. From these studies, we know that national parties remain as MEPs' primary principal, and that both national parties and EP party groups enjoy higher degrees of loyalty than national electorates (e.g., Coman, 2009; Hix et al., 2007; Lindstädt et al., 2011; Roland, 2009 and are more likely to be requested by the EP party groups when national interests are expected to be less vocal (e.g., Carrubba et al., 2009; Finke and Thiem, 2010; Hug, 2010 Hug, , 2012 . Thus, salient discrepancies exist between samples of roll call and non-roll call votes.
While this does not necessarily mean that MEPs approach representation differently when voting by non-roll call, such a possibility appears increasingly plausible.
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It is worth noting that the recent requirement of all final legislative votes to be taken by roll call limits the extent to which roll call and non-roll call samples can differ. However, roll call votes are still used for a minority of voting occasions and proposals originating from some committees that engage with salient policy areas such as Internal Market and Consumer
Protection are rarely voted on by roll call (Carrubba et al., 2006; Gabel and Carrubba, 2004) .
This indicates that non-roll call is unlikely to be used only for the unimportant votes. (Corbett et al., 2011; Hix et al., 2007; Ladrech, 2007) . Thus, the heightened ability to punish and reward MEPs on the basis of their voting choices by virtue of a vote being taken by roll call is considerably more salient to EP party groups.
call votes having to be requested by a political group or at least 40 MEPs. 7 As a result, it is EP party groups who are the driving force behind roll call requests (Carrubba et al., 2006; Saalfeld, 1995; Thiem, 2006) , and there is a general consensus among scholars that the decision to request a roll call vote is a strategic one (Kreppel, 2002) . Three main theoretical explanations of roll call vote requests have been proposed in recent years: to discipline party members (Carey, 2009; Carrubba et al., 2008) , signal policy positions (Ainsley and Maxwell, 2010; Thiem, 2006) , and expose divisions in competing parties (Saalfeld, 1995) . All these imply a desire for high levels of intra-group unity.
From MEPs' point of view, the different reasons for roll call requests create slightly different motivations to follow their EP party group. On the one hand, the disciplining objective -i.e., collecting voting information to accurately dole out reward and punishment (Carrubba et al., 2008 ) -almost compels MEPs to follow their EP party group. They know that EP party groups take heightened interest in their voting choices, and that there is an increased likelihood of benefiting from loyalty (and suffering from disloyalty). This selfinterested incentive to follow their EP party group is simply not present during non-roll call.
On the other hand, the signalling and exposing objectives -i.e., displaying popular positions of own party and unpopular positions of others as well as exposing intra-party dissent within competitors (Saalfeld, 1995) -exert a more subtle influence on MEPs. As fragmented party groups face considerable barriers to accomplish their policy goals and intra-party dissent garners negative media attention (Ainsley and Maxwell, 2012) former (EES, 2012; Farrell et al., 2011) . With MEPs' policy positions naturally aligning more closely with those of their national party, as opposed to those of their EP party group, it is the former that they are more likely to want to follow when there are no external pressures to act otherwise (i.e., when voting by non-roll). 
H1:

Using an Original Survey to Capture MEPs' Perceptions
Since it is nearly impossible to obtain data on MEPs' actual voting choices during roll call and non-roll call voting occasions, a survey of MEPs offers a unique opportunity to tap into MEPs' approach to representation when different voting procedures are used. 9 The analyses presented here rely on an original survey. MEPs were presented with the pre-defined voting dilemma of receiving contrasting voting instructions from their EP party group and national party. 14 The reliance on survey data and MEPs' self-reported behaviour offers unique research opportunities, but also calls for caution. Scholars have correctly noted that survey data can be subject to response bias, a prime example of this being the over-reporting of voter turnout (e.g., Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012) . While it is impossible to verify MEPs' self-perceived non-roll call behaviour, there is evidence to support the reliability of the survey findings.
Namely, MEPs' reported roll call behaviour follows closely their actual roll call behaviour, and the degree of importance they assigned to representing different stakeholders is highly consistent with corresponding evidence from other recent MEP surveys. 15 Moreover, survey data complements the more traditional analyses of roll call voting behaviour. 16 It allows us to explore the structure underlying the attitudes of MEPs that their parliamentary behaviour is based upon (Thomassen et al., 2004) . The public nature of roll call votes means that they may not reveal MEPs' pure preferences regarding representation. Instead, these votes may reveal preferences that are filtered through the prism of strategic calculations and paint the picture of MEPs as they want the world to see them. Survey data allows us to explore MEPs' 'unfiltered' preferences. By promising MEPs anonymity, they had no one to please through their responses and no principal to fear, and therefore, MEPs were able to reveal their underlying attitudes regarding parliamentary representation.
Evaluating the Existence of the Voting Procedure Effect
To determine whether there is a voting procedure effect in MEPs' perceptions of their voting behaviour, I start by examining the rates of defection from their EP party group across the three voting procedures. (Farrell et al., 2011) . 15 See the online appendix, available at identifying website, for further discussion on the appropriateness of using self-reported statements to capture MEPs' parliamentary behaviour. 16 Among else, André and Depauw (2013) and Deschouwer and Depauw (2014) utilised survey data from the cross-national PARTIREP project to explore the parliamentary behaviour of elected representatives, while Andeweg and Thomassen (2005) demonstrated the usefulness of survey instruments to study how MPs' views on representation compare with those of their voters and their own behaviour.
with our understanding that national parties (and not the EP party groups) are MEPs' primary principal.
In addition, voting-perceptions are measured on a 4-point scale, the difference measure ranges from -3 to +3; higher values indicate a greater likelihood of defecting from one's EP party group when voting by the latter procedure in the combination (see Table 2 ). While these MEPs are more likely to defect from their EP party group than MEPs from pre-2004 member states during non-roll call as expected, it is their considerably lower likelihood to defect from their EP party group during roll call that stands out more. While this does not contradict the theoretical expectations regarding the comparative magnitude of the voting procedure effect, the degree to which the latter mechanism is more salient in driving the difference in the voting procedure effect among the two sub-sets of MEPs is surprising and something that future research should explore in more detail. 
Supplementary Analysis
The descriptive analyses demonstrated that that many MEPs believe that they behave differently during non-roll call vs. roll call, and that this difference is pronounced among
MEPs from 2004/07 accession countries. Ideally, I would explore these differences more systematically, controlling for a range of characteristics that could explain MEPs' willingness to defect. Given that many MEPs did not choose to violate the anonymity of the survey, the data does not allow for an extensive multivariate analysis. However, I am able to provide a first-cut descriptive insight into different MEPs' comparative behaviour. In total, 132 MEPs disclosed which member state they were from, and 117 said which EP party group and national party they belonged to.
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Existing research has identified several characteristics that are useful for explaining variation in MEPs' roll call voting behaviour. These include MEPs' role-perception, size and ideology of their EP party group, ballot structure used at the European elections, and whether one's national party is in government or not (e.g., Brzinski, 1995; Hix et al., 2007; Hix and Hoyland, 2011) . Using these insights, Table 5 There are also meaningful differences between MEPs based on the size of their EP party group. When comparing the perceived behaviour of MEPs who belong to the larger vs.
21 These sub-samples are reasonably representative of the full population of MEPs (see Table 5 ). 22 Note that three ordered logistic models, corresponding to the three combinations of voting procedures, were also constructed to gain a multivariate insight into how the voting procedure effect varies across different MEPs (see the online appendix at identifying website). Although the findings of the multivariate analysis need to be treated with caution due to the small-n that can be relied on, it is reassuring that these are very similar to those presented here.
smaller EP party groups, the difference in their mean likelihood of defection during roll call vs. electronic voting is statistically significant at p<.05, and almost reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for roll call vs. show of hands voting (p=.054). Positive differences of .23 indicate that the voting procedure effect -being more likely to defect when voting by non-roll call -is more pronounced among MEPs belonging to the bigger EP party groups. I do not, however, find significant differences in the perceived behaviour of MEPs from countries that use open vs. closed lists for European elections, MEPs who belong to the EP party groups that are more vs. less favourable towards integration, MEPs whose national party is in government vs. opposition, or MEPs who prioritise the representation of European citizens vs. national party voters.
While no causal claims can be drawn from this, initial comparisons do suggest that certain MEPs are more likely to identify a voting procedure effect in their voting behaviour.
At the very least, these analyses highlight the need for further data collection to investigate why some MEPs appear to approach representation differently when voting by non-roll call vs. roll call, while others do not.
Conclusion
While MEPs' voting behaviour is by no means a new field of study, existing research relies heavily on roll call analyses to study representation in the EP. This approach has been invaluable for enhancing our understanding of the kind of representation MEPs provide, but can only tell the full story if the behaviour of MEPs is not influenced by the voting procedure used. At the same time, a growing body of evidence demonstrates that roll call votes are not representative of all parliamentary voting occasions (e.g., Carrubba et al., 2006 Carrubba et al., , 2008 Hug, 2010; Thiem, 2006) . member states lead this voting procedure effect to be more pronounced among MEPs from the newer member states. I test for the presence and direction of the voting procedure effect using original MEP survey data, and find support for both arguments.
My findings contribute to our understanding of MEPs' behaviour in three ways. First, I show that roll call votes tell only part of the story with respect to how MEPs approach representation. While previous studies offer useful theoretical reasons and indirect evidence to suspect that roll call voting could give rise to somewhat different considerations than nonroll call voting, this study is, to my knowledge, the first empirical effort to explicitly show that many MEPs perceive differences to exist in their approach to representation when voting by show of hands or electronically, as opposed to roll call. Thus, this study highlights the need to build upon the traditional roll call analyses of MEPs' voting behaviour.
In addition, the voting procedure effect is not random, but follows a clear pattern, which helps expand our understanding of how successful the different principals -i.e., EP party groups and national parties -are in commanding loyalty from MEPs. While existing research has shown that MEPs align themselves more frequently with their national party than their EP party group during roll call voting occasions (Coman, 2009; Hix et al., 2007) Table A1 below). To show that the survey sample is representative on these two major characteristics, Duncan index of dissimilarity was used. It ranges from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater discrepancy between the full population and the sample (Duncan and Duncan, 1955) . The comparison between the EP party groups in the sample and full population of MEPs (as of 01/01/2011) yields a value of 0.10, while the comparison of EU member states has a value of 0.15. On these two major characteristics, the survey sample is largely representative of the general population of MEPs (see the online appendix, available at identifying website, for further steps that were taken to validate the MEP survey). 
Supplementary Material
This appendix reports supplementary material pertaining to the paper 'Voting Procedures and Parliamentary Representation in the European Parliament'. It presents an additional reliability check for the MEP survey findings and highlights why anonymity was an important element of the MEP survey, discusses the appropriateness of using MEPs' self-reported statements to capture their parliamentary behaviour, and offers a further robustness check for the findings presented in Table 5 of the article.
MEP Survey -Reliability
As part of the survey, respondents were asked about their sense of representation. The The responses, presented in Table S1 , indicate that the mean scores for the three subquestions of representation are highly similar across the surveys. In addition, the comparative importance of the three categories is identical in all surveys; MEPs consistently assign primary importance to representing their national party voters, and consider European-wide interests the least important ones to represent. The MEP survey respondents' opinions do not differ meaningfully from the respondents' of other recent MEP surveys on a key question of representation. This adds further confidence in the reliability of the MEP survey findings. 
MEP Survey -Anonymity
An important element of the survey was anonymity; MEPs were invited, but not required, to identify themselves. This was needed to further ensure the reliability of the MEP survey findings in light of how sensitive the issue of defection is. It has been shown that EP party groups and national parties do punish MEPs for ignoring their voting instructions, and that these punishments can have significant consequences (Hix et al., 2007; Lindstädt et al., 2011) MEPs offer truthful responses on such a sensitive topic, because they can be sure that their EP party group and/or national party cannot become aware of their responses. Therefore, if they approach representation differently during the 'hidden' non-roll call voting occasions, they need not to be concerned about acknowledging it.
Self-Reported Behaviour
The reliance on self-reported statements does of course open the door for potential misrepresentation of one's actual behaviour. For example, it is widely noted that respondents are likely to over-report voter turnout in election surveys because they have an incentive to offer a socially desirable response (e.g., Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012 ). While it is not possible to verify MEPs' survey responses about their behaviour during non-roll call votes, the evidence that is available suggests that these should not include systematic bias.
First, when it comes to reporting which principal MEPs prioritise, there are aspects of social desirability attached to both over-reporting one's likelihood to prioritise the EP party group (i.e., MEPs are meant to act in a supranational manner), as well as national party (i.e., national allegiances dominate MEPs' and European citizens' role and self-perceptions). As such, if the survey's anonymous nature was not sufficient to convince MEPs to offer truthful responses, which in itself is unlikely, any bias that is introduced through misrepresentation of one's behaviour should not be systematic, nor in any particular direction.
Second, where the MEP survey responses can be compared with actual voting choices (i.e., roll call voting), similar patterns emerge. The majority of MEPs claim to prioritise the voting instructions of their national party over those of their EP party group when voting by roll call (Table S2) , which is in line with what is found by existing roll call analyses (e.g., Coman, 2009; Hix et al., 2007) . Empirical evidence that is available does not indicate that MEPs' self-reported behaviour might be a misrepresentation of their actual behaviour.
Finally, MEPs' self-reported statements have been widely used to study aspects of their parliamentary activity, including their approach to representation (e.g., Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Farrell and Scully, 2010; Scully et al., 2012) . Therefore, while it is impossible to be certain of the extent to which survey responses might be biased, it is reassuring that there are reasons to believe this not to be the case and that the reliance on MEPs' selfreported statements is an accepted practice for capturing their approach to representation. 
Multivariate Analysis
In order to add a multivariate insight into the analysis, even though one needs to treat it with caution due to the small-n that can be relied on, Table S3 
